International Court of Justice Muddles Jurisdiction in Yugoslav Genocide Case, The by Graving, Richard
Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 8
9-1-2007
International Court of Justice Muddles Jurisdiction
in Yugoslav Genocide Case, The
Richard Graving
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tjcil
Part of the Law Commons
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Journal
of Comparative and International Law by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact daniel-
bell@utulsa.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard Graving, International Court of Justice Muddles Jurisdiction in Yugoslav Genocide Case, The, 15 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 29
(2007).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tjcil/vol15/iss1/8
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE MUDDLES
JURISDICTION IN YUGOSLAV GENOCIDE CASE
Richard Graving*
I. INTRODUCTION
The International Court of Justice (ICJ or Court) decided in February 2007
that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim brought by Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Bosnia) alleging that Yugoslavia had violated the Genocide
Convention (Convention). ' The Court then ruled that Serbia (the final name of
* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. B.A. 1950, University of Minnesota; J.D. 1953,
Harvard Law School.
1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat.
3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). The
first three of its nineteen articles provide:
Article I
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake
to prevent and to punish.
Article II
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical racial or religious
group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births with the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article III
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
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the respondent) had not committed genocide, incited or conspired to commit
genocide, nor had it been complicit in genocide. However, the Court did find
that Serbia had violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention to
prevent genocide in the Bosnian community of Srebrenica in 1995, and had also
violated the Genocide Convention by failing to cooperate with the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, including failure to render Ratko
Mladi6 for trial by that tribunal. The Court also ruled that Serbia should take
steps to punish the acts of genocide committed and that the Court's findings
constituted sufficient satisfaction for Bosnia and payment of compensation by
Serbia would not be appropriate.
2
The case had been pending and active since 1993. 3  The original
Respondent named was "the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (FRY), the self-
declared continuation in April 1992 of "the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia" (SFRY). 4  The FRY renamed itself "Serbia and Montenegro"
(Serbia-Montenegro) in February 2003, 5 and then became simply "Serbia" when
Montenegro declared independence in 2006. 6 The final Judgment rendered in
2007 was solely against "Serbia."
' 7
This commentary focuses on the Court's consideration and determination of
its jurisdiction ratione personae, that is, (a) the right of access to the Court by
both parties and (b) consent by both parties to the Court's jurisdiction, issues to
which it devoted a substantial segment of its Judgment. Its landmark substantive
rulings on genocide are left for consideration elsewhere. There will be no dearth
of commentary on the impact of those substantive rulings for the development of
humanitarian law and the international law of human rights.
8
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
2. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. Gen. List 91, para. 471 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter
Genocide Judgment 2007].
3. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), April 1, 1993 [hereinafter Genocide Order Apr. 1993];
see MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE, THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR
CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG, 25-30 (Carolina Academic Press 1997) (For a brief account of
the human rights catastrophe on which the case was based).
4. Genocide Judgment 2007, supra note 2, paras. 1, 67. The Court employed the term
"continuator" to describe this claimed status, thus distinguishing it from "successor." Id. at para.
80. The distinction lies at the heart of the jurisdictional question faced by the Court.
5. Id. at para. 32.
6. Id. at para. 67.
7. Id. at para. 77.
8. See e.g., Jason Morgan-Foster & Pierre-Olivier Savoie, World Court Finds Serbia
Responsible for
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In her statement to the press following issuance of the Judgment, Judge
Rosalyn Higgins, President of the Court, described the case as "highly complex"
and "extremely fact-intensive." 9  These points are reflected in the aggregate
length of the Judgment, the Separate Opinions, the Declarations, the Dissenting
Opinions, and the Separate Opinions (excluding translations): 419 pages. 10 One
Separate Opinion was ninety pages. '' Another Judge stated that no other case in
the Court's history had generated such extensive written pleadings. 12 Preceding
it in earlier phases of the case were two Orders for Provisional Measures (1993),
a Judgment on Preliminary Objections (1996), and a Judgment on Application
for Revision (2003). 13 Not included in that formidable archive are the Court's
Order and Judgment in a second case, the 1999 claim by the FRY against ten
NATO members for their use of force in Kosovo (Legality of Use of Force
(2004), in which the Judgment of the Court, rejecting jurisdiction, appeared to be
inconsistent with its Judgments affirming jurisdiction in the earlier phases of the
Genocide case. 14  In fact, the apparent inconsistency regarding essentially
identical facts led many to anticipate the Court's Judgment in the Genocide case
Breaches of Genocide Convention, but Not Liable for Committing Genocide, AM. SOC. INT'L L
(ASIL INSIGHTS. Washinton D.C), http://asil.org/insigdhts/2007/03/insightsO7O4O3.html (last
visited Nov. 2, 2007); Burdens of Proof NOTES FROM THE PRESIDENT, (AM. SOC. INT'L L.,
Washington D.C), available at, http:// www.asil.org/newsletter/president/pres070625.html (last
visited Nov. 2, 2007).
9. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President, Int'l Court of Justice, Press Statement on the Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Feb. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Higgins Statement] available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pr=1898&pt=3&pl=l&p2=3&p3=l (last visited Nov. 2,
2007).
10. See generally Genocide Judgment 2007, supra note 2.
11. See generally id. (separate opinion of Judge Kreda).
12. Id. at para. 72, (separate opinion of Judge Tomka).
13. Genocide Order Apr. 1993, supra note 3; Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), 1993 I.C.J.
325 (Sept. 13) (Further Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures Order of 13 Sept.)
[hereinafter Genocide Order Sept. 1993]; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. 595 (Judgment of
July 11) [hereinafter Genocide Judgment 1996]; Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11
July 1996 in the Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), (Yugo. v. Bosn. & Herz.), 2003
I.C.J. 7 (Feb. 3) [hereinafter Genocide Revision Judgment 2003].
14. Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J. 124, 139 (June 2) (Request for the
Indication of Provisional Measures Order of June 2) [hereinafter NATO Order 1999]; Case
Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.) 2004 l.C.J. 279, 328 (Dec. 15)
[hereinafter NATO Judgment 2004].
2007]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
with considerable interest and even trepidation. 15  Could the Court possibly
"square the circle"? Did it need to?
In taking the unusual step of addressing the press in a Presidential
Statement, Judge Higgins was not only conscious of the concerns about the
Court's consistency, but also of its interest in promoting a reputation for judicial
integrity and relevance. She noted "[t]hat this [was] the first legal case in which
• ,,16
allegations of genocide [had] been made by one State against another. She
noted also that for the parties the results were "mixed," adding somewhat
defensively that this did not indicate a "political compromise."17 She stated the
Court "[had] meticulously applied the law to each and every one of the issues
before it." She was understandably mindful of the criticisms that had been
directed against the Court for some of its past decisions, such as the South-West
Africa Cases (1966), where it appeared to some commentators that the Court had
relied upon cramped reasoning to avoid its responsibilities and accommodate
what it might have perceived as political convenience. 19
Partisan reactions to the Court's Genocide Judgment were immediate. 20
Bosnia in particular complained that the Court had required too high a standard
of proof for Serbo-Montenegran involvement, not only in Srebrenica, but in
other parts of Bosnia as well. 2 1 A leading American academic disparaged the
decision as "Slobodon Milogevi6's Last Waltz." 22  The Court's labored
treatment of its jurisdiction, however, did not attract the attention it deserved,
although it is understandable in view of the rather arcane nature of the issue.
23
This issue attracts more academic than political interest, which is not to deny its
critical significance for future cases and international law in general. It was an
integral part of the Court's controversial "approach." It is the aim of this
commentary to show that the Court's approach was erroneous.
15. See Christine Gray, Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.)(Serb. & Mont. v.
Can.)( Serb. & Mont. v. Fr.) (Serb. & Mont. v. F.R.G.) (Serb. & Mont. v. Italy)( Serb. & Mont. v.
Neth.)( Serb. & Mont. v. Port.)( Serb. & Mont. v. UK): Preliminary Objections. Judgments of l5
December 2004, 54 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 787 (2005).
16. Higgins Statement, supra note 9.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.) (Second Phase), 1966 I.C.J.
6, 325 (July 18); see also Leo Gross, Conclusions, 2 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 747 (Leo Gross ed., 1976) (describing the decision as the "nadir" of the Court's fortunes);
but see Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-Dialogic Abstention by
the International Court of Justice, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 399, 410-15 (1997) (defending as prudent
the Court's refusal to rule on the merits).
20. See Where the Past is Another Country, ECONOMIST, Mar. 3, 2007, at 56.
21. Ruth Wedgwood, Slobodan Milosevi 's Last Waltz, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2007, at A23.
22. Id.
23. See id; see also Burdens of Proof, supra note 8, at 1.
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The Court's ruling on jurisdiction involves a multitude of issues, including
the existence of States, secession of States, succession of States, adherence to
treaties, membership in the United Nations (UN), access to the Court, scope of
review of judgments, res judicata, waiver, estoppel, and good faith. Before
examining the Court's rulings scene-by-scene, it is necessary to review the
political drama surrounding the break-up of the SFRY that began in 1990.
II. POST-1990 POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE BALKANS
"The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY, a founding member
of the United Nations (1945)), consisted of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia,
Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia) and two autonomous
regions (Kosovo and Vojvodina)" when the well-known events serving as the
basis of the alleged genocide began. 24 The nation's fragmentation began when
Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia declared independence in 1991, and Bosnia did
likewise in 1992. 25 Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia were also admitted to the UN
in 1992, and Macedonia was admitted in 1993. 26  Serbia and Montenegro
declared themselves in 1992 to be the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY),
the continuator of the SFRY, not simply its successor.27 Serbia and Montenegro
contained forty-five percent of the SFRY's population and forty percent of its
land mass as well as its capital, Belgrade. 28 Thus, four of the six constituent
components of the SFRY had seceded and two remained as a unit in what came
to be known informally as "rump Yugoslavia." In 2006, Montenegro declared
its independence, leaving Serbia as the only remaining entity of the original
SFRY. 29
The SFRY became a party to the 1948 Genocide Convention in 1950, and
the five seceding States became new parties on the dates of their respective
declarations of independence, by succession, or voluntary accession. 30
24. Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L. 569, 569 (1992).
25. Id. at 570, 593, 594 at n.150; HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, STATE
SUCCESSION: CODIFICATION TESTED AGAINST THE FACTS 276-77 (Pierre Michel Eisemann & Marti
Koskenniemi eds., 2000) [hereinafter HAGUE ACADEMY SUCCESSION].
26. United Nations Member States, Note on Yugoslavia, www.un.org.memberss/growth/shtml
(last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
27. Genocide Judgment 2007, supra note 2, para. 90.
28. Michael P. Scharf, Musical Chairs: The Dissolution of States and Membership in the
United Nations, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 29, 53 (1995).
29. Genocide Judgment 2007, supra note 2, para. 67.
30. Id. at para. 80; see Vienna Convention on succession of States in respect of Treaties, Aug.
23, 1978,1946 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Vienna Succession Treaty], available at
2007]
TULSA J. COMP. & [NT'L L.
Volumes have been written about the effects of political change on the
rights and responsibilities of States that are parties to multilateral treaties
(including the UN Charter).3 1  These political changes include change in
government or administration, whether effected constitutionally or otherwise;
geographical expansion of a State; geographical diminution of a State resulting
from secession or independence (including de-colonization); the disappearance
of a State and the creation of an entirely new State.
32
The jurisdictional problem in the Genocide case originates from the fact
that neither Bosnia nor Serbia existed in their present forms when the SFRY
became a founding member of the UN (1945) or when the SFRY became a party
to the Genocide Convention (1950). 33  To what extent did the rights and
liabilities under these two treaties extend to the time of filing the Bosnian
Application to the Court (1993), and, thereafter, to the time of the Judgment on
the merits in 2007? Access to the Court and its jurisdiction to adjudicate the
dispute depended upon the answer. The point of departure for consideration of
the problem lies in the international law of state succession.
III. STATE SUCCESSION
To describe as law the practice of States with respect to continuity and
succession to treaties may be a misnomer. Such problems arise in contexts that
are both varied and highly politicized, and are characterized by' solutions that
respond more to practicalities than to theoretical formulations. The leading
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/3_2_1978.pdf; and Multilateral
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXXIII/treaty2.asp.
31. LoRi F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 568-89 (4th ed.
2001); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 861-913 (5th ed. 2005); see infra notes 32, 34.
32. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 60-62 (2d ed. 2006); ANTHONY
D'AMATO & JENNIFER ABBASSI, INTERNATIONAL LAW TODAY 90-96 (2006) (setting forth excerpts
from JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1st ed. 1979); MARK
W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 193-97 (4th ed. 2003); STEPHEN C.
MCCAFFREY, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW 150-55 (2006); SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-35 (2006); Detlev F. Vagts, State Succession: The Codifiers' View, 33
VA. J. INT'L L. 275 (1993).
33. Genocide Judgment 2007, supra note 2, at para. 80.
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 208
reporter's note 1 (1987) (describing the practice of succession as to states as uncertain and
confused); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 622 (6th ed. 2003) (stating
that the subject is one of great uncertainty and controversy); BARRY E. CARTER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 466 (5th ed. 2007) (describing the subject as uncertain and subject to
considerable doubt); COUNCIL OF EUROPE, STATE PRACTICE REGARDING STATE SUCCESSION AND
ISSUES OF RECOGNITION: THE PILOT PROJECT OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 146 (Jan Klabbers, Martti
Koskenniemi, Olivier Ribbelink & Andreas Zimmermann eds., 1999) (stating, "that hard and fast
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authority in these matters concluded, after a lifetime of study and exhaustive
exposition, that the question was not suitable for codification. 35  It lay at the
junction of international law and international relations. "The collapse of the
Soviet Union, the disintegration of [the SFRY], the binary fission of
Czechoslovakia and the extinction of East Germany [have all] stretch[ed] the
limits of [traditional] theory about state succession to multilateral treaties."
36
The solutions have been signally of the one-off variety.
The 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in respect of
Treaties (Vienna Succession Treaty), with only twenty-one adherents as of 2007,
may be taken as the best attempt to organize an area of practice that is "uncertain
and confused." 37 It applies (a) universal or automatic succession to new States
that result from secession or separation of territory3 8 and (b) the "clean slate"
principle to newly independent States resulting from "decolonization. 39 The
latter may opt in by notification, but need not do so. 40  Not covered by the
Vienna Succession Treaty is the entity that experiences merely a change in
government, whether by legal or revolutionary means. 41 It is a "continuator,"
not a "successor." The same is true of the remnants of a state after a portion of
its territory has succeeded to form a new state.
42
Application of this scheme to the Genocide case would seem to be simple:
Serbia as the continuator State and the other five former subdivisions of the
rules are difficult to discern"); PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 161 (7th ed. 1997) (declaring that the law on state succession is aptly
described as chaotic); 2 DANIEL P. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (1967) (concluding that the variety of problems raised and the
complicating factors present in concrete cases inhibit the elaboration of a unitary principle); 1
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 209 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992)
(stating that the subject is uncertain and controversial); Matthew C.R. Craven, The Problem of
State Succession and the Identify of States under International Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 142, 142
(1998) (declaring the subject to be largely confused and resistant to simple exposition); Geoffrey
R. Watson, The Law of State Succession, CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 115, 121 (1997) (concluding that states resolve succession questions on practical rather than
theoretical bases).
35. Daniel P. O'Connell, Reflections on the State Succession Convention, 39 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 725, 726 (1979).
36. Richard J. Graving, Status of the New York Arbitration Convention: Some Gaps in
Coverage but New Acceptances Confirm its Vitality, 10 FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1, 19 (1995).
37. See generally Vienna Succession Treaty, supra note 30.
38. Id. art. 15(b).
39. See id art. 16; ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 78-79 (2d ed. 2005).
40. Vienna Succession Treaty, supra note 30, at art. 17.
41. See id art. 2(l)(b) (noting that the definition in effect excluding regime change from
concept of succession); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 714
(2d ed. 2006) (explaining that this practice is in accord with customary international law).
42. Vienna Succession Treaty, supra note 30, at art. 35.
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SFRY as successor States would automatically be bound by the Genocide
Convention. 43 This is especially true of a human rights convention enjoyingjus
cogens/erga omnes status. 44  However, membership in the UN is a different
matter; it is not covered by the Vienna Succession Treaty. 45 The practice here
can be described only as chaotic. The UN makes its own rules as it goes along.
There is no pattern; it depends very much on political "context." 46  Yet
membership in the UN by the FRY, entitling it to access to the Court, as will be
seen below, is a critical predicate for recognizing its status as a party to the
Genocide Convention. The UN's treatment of this issue was, at best, incoherent.
The Judgment in the Genocide case quoted with obvious approval the overly
generous term it had applied in an earlier decision: "confused." 4 7 The saga of
the World Community's confused reaction to the Yugoslav disintegration
follows.
IV. INDECISION, AMBIGUITY, AND CONFUSION AS A RESPONSE
The response of the UN, the European Union (EU), the FRY itself, and the
ICJ, both in earlier phases of the Genocide case and in the related NATO case,
produced a juridical imbroglio of impressive proportion.
Clearly unhappy with the SFRY's military and political "deportment"
during its fragmentation, the UN Security Council and General Assembly barred
the rump Yugoslavia from participation in UN deliberations in 1992, but did not,
in the published opinion of the UN's Under-Secretary-General and Legal
Counsel, expel it or suspend its membership. 48  At the same time, it invited
43. CRAWFORD, supra note 41, at 33-35; OPPENHEIM, supra note 34, at 234-36; Craven, supra
note 34, at 160; Oscar Schachter, State Succession: The Once and Future Law, 33 VA. J. INT'L L.
253, 254-55 (1993); Vagts, supra note 32, at 281 ("[T]he community of states has adamantly ruled
out the argument that a state has escaped any of its treaty obligations by virtue of a change of
regime.").
44. CASSESE, supra note 39, at 78; SHAw, supra note 31, at 885-89; Menno T. Kamminga,
State Succession in Respect of Human Rights Treaties, 7 EuR. J. INT'L L. 469, 472-78, 484 (1996);
Rein Mullerson, The Continuity and Succession of States, by Reference to the Former USSR and
Yugoslavia, 42 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 473, 490-93, (1993); Schachter, supra note 43, at 259.
45. See Vienna Succession Treaty, supra note 30, art. 4; KONRAD G. BUHLER, STATE
SUCCESSION AND MEMBERSHIP 1N INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 30-31 (2001).
46. CRAWFORD, supra note 41, at 175-76, 189-90; OPPENHEIM, supra note 34, at 223 (one
example is the UN's procedure in admitting states that were previously part of India); see also
Scharf, supra note 28, at 67-69 (setting forth one attempt at rationalizing these results).
47. Genocide Judgment 2007, supra note 2, para. 97.
48. Genocide Judgment 2007, supra note 2, paras. 92-93, 95; S.C. Res. 777, 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/777 (Sept. 19, 1992) (copies of S.C. Res. 777, G.A. Res. 47/1 U.N. Doc. AIRES/47/1 (Sept.
22, 1992), and the legal opinions of Under-Secretary-General and Legal Counsel Carl-August
Fleischhauer are reproduced infra as Appendices A, B and C, respectively).
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"Yugoslavia" to apply for membership. 49 This left the rump Yugoslavia, which
continued to insist it was the continuator of the SFRY, in a kind of oxymoronic
limbo. Notwithstanding the schizophrenic posture of the UN's resolutions, the
Secretariat continued to list "Yugoslavia" as a member of the UN, the Yugoslav
flag continued to fly at UN headquarters in New York, and the FRY was still
subject to allocations for the UN budget. 5°
In contrast to that of the UN, and to the dismay of the FRY, the response of
the EU was unequivocal. The Arbitration Commission of the EU Conference for
Peace in Yugoslavia (Badinter Commission) declared in 1992 that "old"
Yugoslavia had been dissolved and that the FRY was a "new" State. 51 The
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (World Bank), and the U.S. Department of State followed suit:
the SFRY was dead.52 This alone did not mean that the Genocide Convention
would not bind the "new" Yugoslavia. It might have succeeded by automatic
succession or by voluntary adhesion. In fact, when it had declared that it was a
continuator (and not just a successor) it had, after all, declared its intention to
honor all treaties of the SFRY, including the Genocide Convention. 53 Bosnia,
for its part, had declared its commitment to be bound by the Genocide
Convention as a successor to the SFRY.54 Thus, it appeared that Bosnia could
bring its claim against the FRY under the terms of Article IX of the Genocide
Convention, which provides:
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation,
application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to
the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated
in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the
request of any of the parties to the dispute. 
55
Consequently, this was the posture of the case when Bosnia filed its claim
in March 1993, and at the same time, applied for the indication of provisional
measures against the FRY while the case was pending.
49. Genocide Judgment 2007, supra note 2, para. 95; S.C. Res. 777, 1, supra note 48; G.A.
Res. 47/1, supra note 48.
50. CRAWFORD, supra note 41, at 707; Yehuda Z. Blum, UN Membership of the "New"
Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 830, 833 (1992).
51. STEVE TERRETT, THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BADINTER ARBITRATION
COMMISSION 178-79 (2000); Scharf, supra note 28, at 56-57.
52. See Scharf, supra note 2, at 54-62.
53. Genocide Judgment 2007, supra note 2, para. 90; see id para. 121.
54. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 30.
55. Genocide Convention, supra note 1, at art. IX.
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V. ORDERS ON PROVISIONAL MEASURES
In April 1993, and again in September of that year, the Court indicated
provisional measures that included a requirement that the FRY take all measures
within its power to prevent the commission of genocide. 56  For purposes of
provisional measures, the Court observed that jurisdiction only needed to be
established prima facie.57 It avoided consideration of whether the FRY was a
member of the UN, and therefore entitled to access to the Court on the basis of
Article 35(1) of the Statute of the Court (Statute), by relying instead on Article
35(2)." Article 35 provides in part:
1. The Court shall be open to the states parties to the present Statute.
2. The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other states shall,
subject to the special provisions contained in treaties in force, be laid down by
the Security Council, but in no case shall such conditions place the parties in a
position of inequality before the Court. 59
The Court interpreted Article 35(2) to include jurisdiction based on a
compromissory clause such as Article IX of the Genocide Convention. The
Court's interpretation constituted a "special provision" affording such access not
only to Bosnia, but to the FRY as well. No mention was made of Article XI of
the Convention that requires UN membership for adherence to the Convention.
61
The Court regarded both parties as bound by the Convention, and therefore,
enjoying the right of access to the Court under the terms of Article 35(2).
VI. JUDGMENTS ON PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS (1996) AND REVISION (2003)
In its 1996 Judgment on preliminary objections, the Court confirmed its
earlier provisional Orders determining that it had jurisdiction to hear the case
56. Genocide Order Apr. 1993, supra note 3, para. 52; Genocide Order Sept. 1993, supra note
13, para. 6; see also LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 501-06 (June 27) (provisional
measures, a kind of interim relief, are legally binding even though article 41 of the Statute uses the
equivocal term "indicate").
57. Genocide Order Apr. 1993, supra note 3, para. 14.
58. Id. paras. 18-19.
59. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1031, 39 AJIL Supp. 215 (1945),arts.
35(1), 35(2) [hereinafter ICJ Statute], available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0.
60. Genocide Order Apr. 1993, supra note 3, paras. 20-23.
61. Genocide Convention, supra note 1 (Article XI, para. 3, provides: "[T]he present
Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-
member State which has received an invitation [from the General Assembly to sign].").
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based on Article IX of the Convention. 62 Once again, Bosnia was taken as a
successor of the SFRY with respect to the Convention, and no issue was raised
as to whether the FRY was a member of the UN. 6 3 That issue was irrelevant
under Article 35(2), which allows access to the Court by non-members when a
treaty compromissory clause provided for Court adjudication. Again, no
reference as to the FRY was made to Article XI of the Convention which
requires UN membership for adherence to the Convention.
The sui generis situation of "Yugoslavia" changed dramatically in October
2000 with the overthrow of Slobodon Milogevi. The replacement government
of Vojislav Ko~tinica immediately applied for, and was granted, UN
membership as a "new" State- the FRY. As a result, it also acceded to the
Genocide Convention in 2001.64 The FRY then took the position that it had not
earlier been a member of the UN, and thus had not been party to the Statute.
Further, the FRY also claimed it had not been party to the Genocide Convention
until it notified the UN of its accession in 2001. It was on this basis that the
FRY applied to the Court for revision of the 1996 Judgment affirming
jurisdiction.
The basis for revision, and the exclusive means under the Statute by which
review is available is set forth in Article 61 of the Statute which provides in
relevant part that:
[a]n application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based
upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor,
which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also
to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not
due to negligence.
66
In 2003, the Court held that the FRY Application was inadmissible. The
Court concluded that the FRY had not established that its request for revision
was "based upon the discovery of 'some fact' which was 'when the judgment
was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision.
'' 6 7
The key to this conclusion was the Court's understanding of "fact." The "fact"
or "facts" were the FRY's later admission to the UN and its accession to the
Genocide Convention. These occurred some four years after the 1996 Judgment.
Therefore, the FRY's admission to the UN and accession to the Genocide
Convention could not have been "unknown facts" existing in 1996.68
62. Genocide Judgment 1996, supra note 13, paras. 17-20; see also id. para. 47(2)(a).
63. See Genocide Judgment 1996, supra note 13, para. 20.
64. Genocide Revision Judgment 2003, supra note 13, paras. 49-52.
65. Id. paras. 18-20.
66. ICJ Statute, supra note 59, art. 61(1).
67. Genocide Revision Judgment 2003, supra note 13, para. 72.
68. See id. paras. 72-75.
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VII. THE NATO CASE: PROVISIONAL MEASURES
NATO forces began air strikes against the FRY in March 1999 to avert
what its Secretary-General called "a humanitarian catastrophe."' 69  The FRY
government had refused repeated demands that its military and paramilitary
forces withdraw from anti-personnel operations in Kosovo province, whose
rebellious population was predominantly Albanian, not Serbian. 70  The
following month, the FRY (later "Serbia-Montenegro") "instituted
proceedings... against Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. . ." for
a series of alleged violations of international law, including violations of the
Genocide Convention. 7 1 The FRY also requested the indication of provisional
measures pending resolution of the dispute.
The Court may indicate provisional measures of protection, comparable to a
preliminary injunction in civil common law, if it appears there is an urgent need
to preserve the rights of the parties and if it has prima facie jurisdiction. 73
Application of this faculty to the Genocide case was discussed above in Part V.
74
For the first time in its history, the Court concluded in the NATO case that
provisional measures should not issue because it did not have prima facie
jurisdiction. 75 This did not mean the Court could not find jurisdiction in later
phases of the case.76
The FRY invoked several bases for jurisdiction. Article IX of the Genocide
Convention, to which the FRY and all respondents were parties, provided that
disputes between the parties could be submitted to the Court for resolution. 77 In
the case of Spain and the United States, however, their reservations to that
Article excluded any right of submission to the Court. The Court accordingly,
and summarily, dismissed them from the case in limine litis.78 The requisite
consent to jurisdiction did not exist since there was no jurisdiction ratione
69. STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 409-13 (3d ed. 2002).
70. Peter H. F. Bekker, International Decision: Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. BeIg.) (Yugo.
v. Can.) (Yugo. v. Fr.) (Yugo. v. F.R.G.) (Yugo. v. Italy) (Yugo. v. The Neth.) (Yugo. v. Port.1)
(Yugo. v. Spain) (Yugo. v. U.K.) (Yugo. v. U.S.), 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 928, 928 (1999).
71. Id. at 928-29.
72. Id.
73. See para. 21.; Peter H. F. Bekker & Christopher J. Borgen, World Court Rejects Yugoslav
Requests to Enjoin Ten NATO Members from Bombing Yugoslavia, AM. SOC. INT'L L (ASIL
INSIGHTS. Washington D.C) (June 1999), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh36.htm.
74. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
75. Bekker & Borgen, supra note 73.
76. See NATO Order 1999, supra note 14, para. 21.
77. Id. para. 34.
78. See Bekker, supra note 70, at 929 n. 1.
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personae over them. In regard to all ten respondents, the Court observed that
genocide requires not only acts but intent to commit genocide as well. The
Court could not find at that stage in the proceedings that genocide had been
committed by any of the respondents. 79  Thus, there was no prima facie
jurisdiction ratione materiae. It remained a matter to be considered in
subsequent proceedings as to all respondents except Spain and the United States.
Yet another basis invoked by the FRY for jurisdiction was its declaration
under Article 36(2) of the Statue, the so-called optional clause, recognizing the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in relation to any other state accepting the
same obligation. Here, the Court pointed out the FRY declaration restricted its
application to events arising after April 25, 1999, and that the NATO bombings
had begun on March 24, 1999, thus, excluding applicability of the FRY's Article
36(2) declaration. 8 1  Since those respondents who made declarations under
Article 36(2) could invoke the FRY's condition by reciprocity, there was no
primafacie jurisdiction ratione temporis.82 This included Belgium, Canada, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain (already dismissed entirely), and the United
Kingdom. 83  These respondents had further argued that even if the ratione
temporis defense did not apply, the FRY was barred from access to the Court
because it was not a member of the UN, and therefore, denied access under the
84Statute. The Court refused to rule on this argument in view of its ruling on
ratione temporis. 85 Once again, the Court declined to attempt an untying of the
Gordian Knot: the UN membership vel non of the FRY during the relevant
periods of time.
At this point, before proceeding to the controversial and divided NATO
Judgment on Preliminary Objections (2004), it is useful to clarify an important
distinction between (a) the right of access to the Court (locus standi), either as an
applicant or a respondent, and (b) the consent needed for Court jurisdiction.
Access to the Court may be considered part of the jurisdictional issue or it may
be considered a matter preliminary to jurisdiction. The result is the same except
that access is a matter of law for the Court, not the parties, while consent is a
matter that the parties control through their own decisions. This distinction was
made clear by the Court in the NATO Judgment on Preliminary Objections in
79. NATO Order 1999, supra note 14, paras. 40-41.; Bekker, supra note 70, at 930; Gray,
supra note 15, at 736.
80. lCJ Statute supra note 59, at art. 36(2); NATO Order 1999, supra note 14, paras. 22-23.
81. NATO Order 1999, supra note 14, paras. 24-29.
82. Id. at para. 30.
83. Bekker, supra note 70, at 930 (allowing respondent to invoke applicant's reservation by
reciprocity).
84. NATO Order 1999, supra note 14, paras. 31-32.
85. See id. at para. 33.
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2004, and later in the Genocide Judgment on the Merits in 2007. 86 Article 35(1)
of the Statute deals only with access, Article 35(2) concerns access based on
consent, and Article 36 only addresses consent. For jurisdiction, both access and
consent must exist.
The Court's Order on provisional measurers in the NATO case set the stage
for one of the Court's most controversial decisions.
VIII. THE NATO CASE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
The Court's final Judgment, dismissing the FRY's claims on jurisdictional
grounds, was rendered in 2004. The Court unanimously found that it had no
jurisdiction to entertain the FRY claims (the FRY became Serbia-Montenegro as
of 2003). 87  Seven of the fifteen members of the Court (the Seven) filed a
strongly worded Joint Declaration disputing the Court's bases for the
Judgment. 88 The Court's bases were: (1) the ambiguity in Yugoslavia's status as
a member of the UN was clarified when it "joined" the UN in 2000; it could not
therefore be vested with access to the Court in 1999 when the case was brought
(under Article 35(1) of the Statute only UN members have access to the Court) 89
and (2) access by non-members under Article 35(2) by virtue of a
compromissory clause in a treaty was not available to Serbia-Montenegro
because the treaty it invoked, the Genocide Convention of 1948, entered into
force after the Statute was adopted in 1945. The phrase "treaties in force" means
only those in force when the Statute was adopted. The Court conceded that it
did not know of any such treaties, but pointed out the language had been
reproduced in haec verba from the Statute of the Court's predecessor, the
Permanent Court of International Justice (1921-1946), which did cover certain
post-World War I treaties.
90
The Court's reliance on Article 35 was highly controversial. The Seven,
who agreed with the ultimate result of the Judgment but disputed the Court's
ratio decidendi, said the Judgment was at odds with a number of previous
86. NATO Judgment 2004, supra note 14, para. 36; Genocide Judgment 2007, supra note 2,
paras. 102-03.
87. NATO Judgment 2004, supra note 14, para. 129.; Peter Bekker et al., The World Court
Dismisses Serbia and Montenegro's Complaints Against Eight NA TO Members, AM. SOC. INT'L L
(ASIL INSIGHTS, Washington D.C) (Dec. 2004) available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/2004/12/insight041223.htm.
88. NATO Judgment 2004, supra note 14, para. 1.
89. Id at para. 46; id at para. 52; id at paras. 78-79; id. at para. 91.
90. Id. at paras. 102-103; John R. Crook, The 2004 Judicial Activity of the International Court
of Justice, 99 AM. J. INT'L. L. 450, 456 (2005) (expressing the view that his interpretation left Art.
35(2) an "empty box").
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decisions of the Court.9 1 First, in the 1999 Orders rejecting the indication of
provisional measures in the NATO case, the Court had assigned its negative
decisions on prima facie jurisdiction to ratione temporis and ratione materiae
grounds; these are "consent" grounds. Yet here, the Court has invoked "access"
reasoning under both 35(1) and 35(2) to bar access on ratione personae grounds
because the FRY was neither a member of the UN nor a non-member party to a
qualifying treaty. The Seven labeled the change "surprising."
92
Second, the "new" reasoning of the Court was also contrary to its position
in the Genocide case. In the Provisional Measures phase (1993), in the
Preliminary Objections phase (1996), and in the Revision phase (2003), the
Court regarded the FRY as having had access to the Court at the relevant times
as a member of the UN and, therefore, party to its Statute. The majority's
interpretation of Article 35(2) was also contrary to the Court's interpretation of
Article 35(2) in the Provisional Measures phase of the Genocide case, in which it
was clear that it did not matter that the Genocide Convention had entered into
force after adoption of the Court's Statute.
93
The Seven said that when more than one basis for a decision existed, the
Court was free to adopt the one it thought best for reasons of certainty. Certainty
meant taking into account consistency, legal cogency, and consequences for
other pending cases. The Seven determined that the Court's reasoning failed to
meet these criteria.
94
Judge Higgins, a member of the Seven, added another reason for diverging
from the majority's approach. Since the FRY had merely asked the Court "to
decide on jurisdiction" rather than specifying a ground, it thereby violated
Article 38(2) of the Court's Rules. In other words, the FRY "was trying to have
it both ways." The Court should have stricken the case from the docket by the
exercise of its inherent powers. 95 Judge Kooijmans concurred. 96
It was against this rather disorderly background that Court observers
awaited the Judgment on the merits in the Genocide Case. Could the Court, with
reason and justice, extricate itself from the confusion it had sown? 97 Did the
FRY have access vulnerability or not?
91. See 2004 I.C.J. 279, (Joint Declaration of Vice President Ranjeva, Judges Guillaume,
Higgins, Kooijmans, AI-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and Elaraby) at para. 1, ("profoundly"
disagreeing with the Court's reasoning).
92. Id. at para. 9.
93. Id. at paras. 8-11.
94. Id. at paras. 2-3, 12-13, Chester Brown, Access to International Justice in the Legality of
Use of Force Cases, 64 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 267, 271 (2005) (asserting the Court "would have done
well to find less problematic grounds on which to base its decision.").
95. 2004 I.C.J. 279 (Separate opinion of Judge Higgins) at paras. 12, 15.
96. 2004 I.C.J. 279 (Separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans) at paras. 22-26.
97. See Becker et al., supra note 87, nn.20-23.
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IX. THE GENOCIDE CASE: MERITS
In its Judgment on the Merits, the Court ruled by a vote of ten to five that it
had jurisdiction over the case based on Article IX of the Genocide Convention. 98
To reach this result, it avoided one more time the question of whether the FRY
was a member of the UN during the crucial period from 1992 to2000, and
therefore entitled to Court access. The Court invoked what it determined were
the resjudicata effects of its 1996 Judgment on Preliminary Objections. 9 9 That
Judgment apparently relied on Article 35(2) of the Statute (which affords Court
access to non-members of the UN who are party to an appropriate
compromissory clause of a treaty "in force") by referring back to its April 1993
Order on provisional measures.100  UN membership under Article 35(1) was
irrelevant. Access (orjus standi) under Article 35 was, declared the Court, an
inevitable corollary of consent. 101 Also not addressed by the Court in 1996, was
whether or not "treaties in force" was to be understood as limited to those that
entered into force before adoption of the Statute in 1945. The Court simply
assumed the phrase was not so limited. This assumption was expressly rejected
in the NATO case.102
To apply res judicata to the 1996 understanding of scope of "treaties in
force," meant in 2007 that the Court had to regard its earlier "broad"
understanding of "treaties in force" as an integral part of the Judgment. Yet the
Court said nothing about this issue in 1996. In 2007, the Court declared access a
matter of "necessary implication", entitled to res judicata.10 3  The Court
explained:
[i]n the view of the Court, the express finding in the 1996 Judgment that the
Court had jurisdiction in the case ratione materiae, on the basis of Article IX of
the Genocide Convention, seen in its context, is a finding which is only
consistent, in law and logic, with the proposition that, in relation to both Parties,
it had jurisdiction ratione personae, in its comprehensive sense, that is to say,
that the status of each of them was such as to comply with the provisions of the
Statute concerning the capacity of States to be parties before the Court .... The
determination by the Court that it had jurisdiction under the Genocide
Convention is thus to be interpreted as incorporating a determination that all the
98. Genocide Judgment 2007, supra note 2 at paras. 140, 471(1).
99. Id. at para. 140.
100. Id. at para. 105, (referring to Genocide Order Apr. 1993, supra note 3, para. 1 9).
101. See id. at para. 136 (calling it "a matter of logical construction").
102. See Crook, supra note 90, at 456.
103. Genocide Judgment 2007, supra note 2, para 132.
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conditions relating to the capacity of the Parties to appear before it had been
met. 104
Judges Ranjeva, Shi, and Koruma, who voted against the jurisdictional
dispositif, argued res judicata could not be applied to an issue which was not
addressed, let alone decided.' 0 5 This violated Article 56(1) of the Statute, which
requires the Court to state the reasons on which the judgment is based. The
Court had not addressed access in its 1996 Judgment, and the parties themselves
had not even raised the question, for varying, but understandable reasons of their106
own. The Court did, however, deal with the issue of access in the NATO
case. It was inconsistent of the Court not to do so here. 1
0 7
Judge Skotnikov, who also voted against the jurisdictional dispositif, took a
stronger line. Even if the Court had considered the access issue in 1996, its
ruling could not have been considered absolute and final. 108 Judge Kre~a, the ad
hoc designee of the FRY, argued at treatise-format length (ninety pages) that the
NATO Judgment disposed of the problem and should have been followed in the109
present case.
Three Judges, voting in favor of the jurisdictional dispositif, supported it on
grounds other than res judicata. Judge Al-Khasawneh, Vice President of the
Court, had serious doubts about the need to rely on res judicata when it was
clear the FRY had never been anything but a member of the UN. The admission
to the UN in 2000 was merely a conversion from continuator status to successor
status. 110 Judge Tonka voted in favor of the dispositif but on the basis that the
FRY was a party to the Genocide Convention in 1993, by the rules of state
succession, and the FRY's lack of access was cured retroactively by its
admission to the UN in 2000.111 Judge Mahiou, the ad hoc designee of Bosnia
argued that Serbia should be barred from raising the access issue because of
acquiescence, estoppel, or good faith. 112 These arguments closely tracked the
Bosnian pleadings.
104. Id. para. 133.
105. 2007 I.C.J. Gen. List 91 (Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Ranjeva, Shi, and Koroma).at
para. 3.
106. Id. at paras. 3,7.
107. Id. at para. 17.
108. 2007 I.C.J. Gen. List 91 (Declaration of Judge Skotnikov) at para. 3.
109. See 2007 I.C. J. Gen. List 91 (Separate Opinion of Judge Kreda) at para. 47.
110. 2007 I.C.J. Gen. List 91(Dissenting Opinion of Vice President Al-Khasawneh) at paras. 9-
10.
111. 2007 I.C.J. Gen. List 91 (Separate opinion of Judge Tomka) at para. 27 (stating that similar
circumstances would be covered after admission).
112. 2007 I.C.J. Gen. List 91 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Mahiou) at paras. 13-18; (explaining
that the Court rejected Mahiou's position on grounds that it related to consent, not access); see
Genocide Judgment 2007, supra note 2 paras. 102-03.
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X. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
It remains to analyze the performance of the Court in confronting a
concededly difficult situation, both legal and political. Did the Court's decisions
on jurisdiction unnecessarily describe a circle that needed to be squared? If so,
did it succeed? Does it matter? What are the implications of the Court's
treatment of the suit by Croatia against the FRY filed in 1999, in which the
question of access is not addressed even by implication?"
3
The Court's struggles with jurisdiction and consistency emanated from a
single, core fact: the SFRY had broken up and the UN manifestly failed to
respond in accordance with its Charter. The UN response was a political
compromise without juridical coherence. Examples abound of UN practices
adopted to fill gaps in Charter coverage or to resolve otherwise practical
problems, 1 14 but the result of the abortive attempt to expel Yugoslavia/FRY,
under whatever name it had chosen to adopt, pursuant to its internal
constitutional processes, was clearly ultra vires. The attempt to expel
Yugoslavia/FRY was also contrary to its past practices regarding the secession
of Pakistan from India (1947), the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan
(1974), and the secession of Singapore from Malaysia (1965). 115
Membership in international organizations is governed by their constitutive
documents. 116
Articles V and VI of the UN Charter provide:
[a] Member of the United Nations against which preventive or
enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be
suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership
by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council.
This exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security
Council. 17
A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the
Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the
113. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Croat. v. Yugo.), 1999 Gen. List 118 (July 2) [hereinafter Croatian Genocide Application 1999].
114. Major examples of UN "creativity" are the 1950 Uniting for Peace Resolution of the
General Assembly, providing for peace-keeping efforts in the absence of Security Council action,
and the significant development of action undertaken under the provisions of Chapter VII. CARTER
ET AL., supra note 34, at 1039-50 (quoting THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE 24-40
(2002)).
115. In each case, the non-seceding state was considered a continuator. See CRAWFORD, supra
note 41, at 392-93; see Blum, supra note 50, at 832; see Scharf, supra note 28, at 34-35.
116. See BORLER, supra note 45, at 30-31.
117. UN Charter 59 Stat. 1031, art. 5, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
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Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security
Council. 118
These provisions, the only ones of substantive relevance, were neither
invoked nor followed. In fact, "no member state has ever been suspended or
expelled from the [UN]."119 Nor can these provisions be circumvented in good
faith by the transparent expedient of simply declaring that Yugoslavia had
"ceased to exist.' The legal opinion of the UN Under-Secretary for Legal
Affairs was that the General Assembly's resolution neither terminated nor
suspended the membership of Yugoslavia.121 That disposes of the "extinction"
fallacy, afortiori.
In its April and September 1993 Orders indicating interim measures, the
Court provisionally, but explicitly, excluded consideration of "whether or not
Yugoslavia is a Member of the United Nations and as such a party to the Statute
of the Court ... ." 122 In its Application, Bosnia conceded that the UN solution
poses legal difficulties and relied on Article 35(2) of the Statute for access and
prima facie jurisdiction. It is not surprising that the Court found that under
Article 35(2), concerning non-UN Member parties to treaties with
compromissory clauses, it enjoyed ratione personae jurisdiction and the parties
enjoyed the concomitant right of access. The Court's aversion to 35(1) when
35(2) was at hand, and in fact, had been pled, is understandable, even if unwise.
The Court also found that primafacie jurisdiction ratione materiae existed under
Article IX of the Genocide Convention. This seems obvious in view of Bosnia's
allegations.
The temporal scope of "treaties in force" under Article 35(2) was not
addressed in 1993 by the parties or the Court. In retrospect, an explicit statement
of the Court's "broad" understanding of the term's unlimited time span could
have eliminated the complications arising from the Court's later limited
interpretation in the NATO case, but at that juncture, the Court as a whole was
probably well advised to preserve its options.
The 1996 Judgment on Preliminary Objections was essential in providing
the basis for the 2007 Judgment on the Merits, although it did not represent a
significant change in the approach or analysis of the Court. The 1996
proceedings were simply a reprise of the 1993 proceedings on interim measures.
Neither party raised the issue of Yugoslavia's membership vel non in the UN and
118. Id. at art. 6.
119. Blum, supra note 50, at 831 n.3.
120. The words "ceased to exist" contained in Security Council Resolution 777 were deleted
from General Assembly Resolution 47/1 to satisfy those states that opposed the expulsion of the
FRY. HAGUE ACADEMY SUCCESSION, supra note 25, at 283.
121. Infra app. C.
122. Genocide Order Apr. 1993, supra note 3, para. 18.
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therefore, access to the Court under Article 35(1). Once again, the Court
declared jurisdiction ratione personae existed by virtue of Article IX of the
Genocide Convention. This time the Court did not explain, as it had in the
interim measures phase, that it ignored the UN membership issue and the Court
did not express a view on the scope of "treaties in force." Again, it assumed sub
silentio that the phrase was not limited to treaties entered into force before
adoption of the Statute in 1945. In retrospect, it would have made matters
simpler for the Court if it had done so during this phase.
Of particular interest in analyzing the Court's performance is the total
absence in the earlier phases of what it later came to regard as crucial to its
approach: the distinction between access/jus standi and jurisdiction ratione
personae (stricto sensu). 123 The former, the Court later said, was a matter for
the Court to determine without reference to party consent; the latter, in contrast,
was a matter of party consent. 124 This made it easier for the Court to apply res
judicata in 2007 to a matter it had decided earlier only "by necessary
implication."
In 1999, while the Genocide case was pending, the FRY filed its
Application against the ten NATO countries for violation of the Genocide
Convention. For jurisdiction, it invoked Article IX of the Genocide Convention
and its Declaration under the Optional Clause, Article 36(2). Later that year, the
Court refused interim measures on the grounds that prima facie jurisdiction was
lacking, specifying: (1) ratione materiae under the Genocide Convention
("intent" to commit genocide was not shown) and (2) ratione temporis under
Article 36(2) because of the FRY's time limitation invoked by the respondents
on the basis of reciprocity (i.e., if the applicant could not sue the respondent
because of its time limitation then the respondent can invoke that same limitation
against the applicant). The FRY had claimed continuing UN membership but
several of the NATO respondents had denied it. However, the Court declared it
was not necessary to address that issue because the FRY was barred, at least
prima facie, on other grounds from obtaining interim measures. Only three of
the Judges even mentioned the UN membership matter, two denying
membership (Judge Oda and Judge Kooijmans) and one arguing the Court
should have addressed the issue (the FRY-appointed ad hoc Judge Kre6a). 125
123. If the term "jurisdiction ratione personae" is raised to a level of generality to embrace
"access/jus standi" as well, it might be appropriate to describe it as "jurisdiction ratione personae
(lato sensu)" (although the Court does not employ this particular terminology to distinguish its
broader scope from "jurisdiction ratione personae (stricto sensu)").
124. See NATO Judgment 2004, supra note 14, para. 36; see Genocide Judgment 2007, supra
note 2, paras. 102-03.
125. 1999 I.C.J. 124 (Separate Opinion of Judge Oda) at paras. 3-4; 1999 I.C.J.124, (Separate
Opinion of Judge Kooijmans) at para. 25, 1999 I.C.J. 124 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Krera) at
para. 9.
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The 1999 NATO Orders were unremarkable and consistent with prior
holdings in the Genocide case. The Court continued to avoid resolving the UN
membership dilemma the General Assembly had left it. Meanwhile,
Yugoslavia's UN status remained on hold.
The picture changed dramatically in November 2000. The FRY requested,
and was granted, admittance to the UN as a "new" member, and in March 2001,
the FRY "acceded" to the Genocide Convention. It immediately petitioned the
Court for a revision of the 1996 Judgment on Preliminary Objections, based on
the claims that the FRY had not been a member of the UN before 2000, and that
it was not a party to the Genocide Convention before 2001. This volte-face
made resolution of the UN's contradictory actions seem inevitable, but this was
not to be.
In its Judgment on Revision in 2003, the Court once again sidestepped the
UN membership problem with a strict, but quite sensible, reading of Article
61(1). The Court concluded the FRY request was not based upon the discovery
of some fact that was unknown to the Court and to the party claiming revision
when the judgment was rendered. The "fact" had occurred more than four years
after the Judgment, and the date of the fact's occurrence was more significant
than any putative effect it might have had. The court held the application was
"inadmissible." 126
It is difficult to argue with the Court's conclusion, especially since the
Statute makes no other provision for "review," except for the possibility of
clarification under Article 60. A judgment is "final and without appeal." It
should be noted that if the Court had earlier been required or inclined to apply
the same rigorous standards of interpretation, it would have ruled that the FRY
remained a member of the UN and a party to the Genocide Convention
throughout.
The Court's subsequent Judgment of 2004 on Preliminary Objections in the
NATO case overturned its careful, previous attempts to deal with the UN's
ambiguous treatment of Yugoslavian statehood. The Judgment conflicted
"vertically" with its previous rulings in the case and "horizontally" with its
rulings in the Genocide case. Except for Judge Owada's somewhat tortured
attempt at reconciliation in his Separate Opinion in the 2007 Genocide
Judgment, the decision was seen by most observers as totally at odds with all
that had gone on before. 1
27
For the first time in the history of the two cases, Genocide and NATO, a
majority of the Court dealt directly with Yugoslavian statehood. While all
fifteen members of the Court rejected jurisdiction, eight Judges ruled the FRY
had not been a UN member at the time its Application was filed in 1999, and
126. Genocide Revision Judgment 2003, supra note 13, paras. 72, 74-75.
127. 2007 I.C.J. Gen. List 91, supra note 2 (Separate Opinion of Judge Owada) (Feb. 11).
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therefore, under Article 35(1) did not enjoy the right of Court access at that
time. 128 The eight regarded the FRY's admission to UN membership in 2000 as
clarifying, retroactively, the ambiguity that had existed since 1992.129
Admission in 2000 meant non-admission before that date. The logical difficulty
with this is that the conclusion begs the question: what was the effect of the 2000
admission? It could be regarded as a confirmation of previously existing
membership, especially since the purported expulsion by the political branches
of the UN was dubious at best. 130 This was the separate view of Judge Elaraby,
a member of the group of seven Judges who disputed the Court's ratio
decidendi. 131
After an extensive review of the travaux pr~paratoires, the eight Judges
then went on to rule out access on the basis of Article 35(2).132 In contrast to the
unstated premise in the Genocide case that access under Article 35(2) as a non-
UN member was available, the eight declared the door was open only through
"treaties in force" before 1945, the date the Statute was adopted. 133 Thus, access
for the FRY was barred regardless of whether the SFRY ratified the Convention
in 1950 or the FRY acceded to the Convention in 2001. Continuity or
succession was irrelevant; access was barred ratione temporis. This
interpretation is not unreasonable even though it is ineffective. 134 What purpose
does the provision serve if access to the Court is effectively cut off at the very
time the Court is created? On the other hand, can it be that the broader
interpretation is really carte blanche for any two or more countries to agree
between or among themselves to seize the Court at its leisure? The leading
commentator on the Court agrees with the majority, and urged a restrictive view
of Article 35(2) even before the Court had ruled. 135
The seven dissenters profoundly disagreed with the reasoning on which the
Court had based its Judgment. The Judgment was not consistent with past case
law. The Court ruled on grounds that were less certain than others available,
such as ratione temporis and ratione materiae, and its Judgment called into
128. NATO Judgment 2004, supra note 14, para. 91.
129. See id. paras. 78-79.
130. If not a confirmation of existing membership, then at least a recognition of state succession.
131. See 2004 I.C.J.279, (Separate Opinion of Judge Elaraby) at para.2; supra note 14, paras. 2,
9.
132. Id. at paras. 113-14.
133. Id.
134. See Crook, supra note 90, at 455-56.
135. See 2 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920-
1996, 628-30 (3d ed. 1997); see 2 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920-2005, 609-(4th ed. 2006).
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question the solutions adopted in the Genocide case. 136 Two of the seven Judges
would have gone further, dismissing the case for the FRY's failure to state the
basis for the Court's jurisdiction, rather than permitting the FRY to "ask[] the
Court 'to decide on... jurisdiction."" 3 7
In its 2007 Judgment on the Merits in the Genocide case, the Court declared
in its dispositif on jurisdiction that it had jurisdiction based on Article IX of the
Genocide Convention. The vote was ten to five. The decision rested on the
principle of resjudicata; the matter had been "decided" in the1996 Judgment on
Preliminary Objections even though access to the Court was never raised as an
issue; the Court held it was a "necessary implication" of the Judgment. 138
There were five dissenters on this point. Judges Ranjeva, Shi, and Koroma,
writing in a Joint Dissenting Opinion, argued that the Court was required to state
its reasons under Article 56(1) of the Statute. The Court had not done so in
1996, therefore an implication could not serve as the basis for applying res
judicata. They added that the parties had not even raised the issue in 1996 and
that the Court's reasons, for purposes of resjudicata, had to be circumscribed by
the issues presented to it. Finally, they declared that the issue of UN
membership should have been addressed in 2007, and the finding should have
been that the FRY was not a UN member in 1993.139 Therefore, the FRY was
not entitled to Court access at that time. This resulted necessarily from the fact
that the FRY had become a member, new or otherwise, in 2000. The three
characterized the Court's Judgment on this matter as "untenable as a matter of
law." 140  Judge Skotnikov, in his separate declaration, said the matter had
already been decided in the 2004 NATO Judgment: the FRY had not been a UN
member before 2000. That was determinative. He also stated that resjudicata
should not apply in incidental proceedings such as those conducted in 1996.141
Judge Kre~a, appointed ad hoc by the FRY, said essentially the same, at much
greater length, in his separate opinion.1
42
XI. EVALUATION
An evaluation of the Court's handling of the various cases spawned by the
Yugoslav breakup must focus on two separate periods: (a) from the breakup of
136. 2004 I.C.J. 279 (Joint Declaration of Vice-President Ranjeva, Judges Guillaume, Higgins,
Kooijmans, A1-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and Elaraby) at para. 13.
137. 2004 .C.J. 279 (Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins) at para. 14.
138. Genocide Judgment 2007, supra note 2, para. 132.
139. 2007 l.C.J. Gen. List 91 (Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Ranjeva, Shi and Koroma) at
para. 13.
140. Id. at para. 3.
141. 2007 I.C.J. Gen. List 91 (Declaration of Judge Skotnikov) at 1-2.
142. See 2007 I.C.J. Gen. List 91 (Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Kre~a).
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the SFRY to the FRY's "admission" to the UN (1991/1992 to 2000) and (b) the
post-admission period (2001-2007). That evaluation, in turn, must take into
account the Court's role as a principal organ of the UN, not simply as an
independent dispute-resolving, juridical entity like its predecessor, the
Permanent Court of International Justice, which was not linked organizationally
with the League of Nations. 
143
There are two primary motives propelling the political response of the UN
and other international institutions to the Yugoslav break-up: (1) revulsion
against the human rights violations ascribed to the Serb-dominated Belgrade
government, 144 and (2) a need, or at least desire, to justify intervention on
grounds that the military struggles engendered were international in character,
rather than a matter assigned to the domestic jurisdiction of a single state. 145 An
evaluation of the Court's response must begin with an acceptance of these
premises. The framework questions for an evaluation of the Court's treatment of
the Yugoslav breakup in the Genocide case are: Could the Court have disagreed
with the political organs of the UN? Should it have done so in the Genocide
case?
For the Indication of Provisional Measures phase of the Genocide case in
1993, the Court explicitly avoided the access question of UN membership for the
FRY under Article 35(1) of the Statute by invoking the non-UN membership
access provision of Article 35(2). This involved interpreting 35(2) to embrace
agreements with compromissory clauses that were entered into after the 1945
adoption of the Court's Statute, such as the Genocide Convention of 1950. The
Court's leading commentator had already rejected that interpretation, arguing for
a 1945 cut-off date, but the Court felt it unnecessary to deal with an opinion
contrary to the one it adopted. During the Preliminary Objections phase in 1996,
the Court made no mention of the 35(2) access basis. It ruled simply that Article
IX of the Genocide Convention provided the basis for jurisdiction ratione
personae. In its 2007 Judgment on the Merits, it applied res judicata to the
access issue it had not mentioned in 1996 on the grounds the issue had been
decided during the 1996 proceedings by necessary implication. This raises the
next question: Why had the Court adopted in 1993 an interpretation of 35(2) that
had already been authoritatively questioned by a leading commentator (and that
it later repudiated in the NATO case), leaving it little choice in the 2007
Genocide Judgment than resort to resjudicata? Reliance on 35(1) was at hand,
143. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT 15 (5th ed. 1995).
144. Blum, supra note 50, at 830; see Yehuda Z. Blum, Correspondents' Agora: U.N.
Membership of the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L. L. 248, 249 (1993) (providing Professor
Blum's reply to a letter written to the Journal's Editor in Chief).
145. CRAWFORD, supra note 41, at 714. The efforts of international institutions are described in
considerable detail, with abundant endnotes, in TERRETT, supra note 51, at 69-118.
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and was juridically more cogent. It was rejected, it seems, in deference to the
perceived preferences of a majority in the Security Council, and of a somewhat
ambiguous majority in the General Assembly.
Clearly, the SFRY/FRY was neither suspended nor expelled from UN
membership under the terms of the UN Charter. The only provisions applicable
to suspension and expulsion are Articles V and VI of the Charter.146 The UN
Legal Counsel was simply reading these provisions as written and as intended
when he declared that Yugoslavia continued as a member of the UN, albeit on a
restricted basis.
The Court's avoidance of the question of access by membership on the
basis that the issue was not free from legal difficulties was, at best, inapposite.
The only possible basis for doubt might be the reference to filing a future
application for membership, but the remainder of the text in the two resolutions
makes it clear that suspension or expulsion had not occurred under the terms of
the Charter. Further, application for membership was something to be done in
the future by the FRY, not necessarily a sine qua non requirement of FRY
membership. A new application for "admission" might just as well be equated
to a matrimonial renewal of vows ceremony. A second basis for the Court's
avoidance of the membership issue under 35(1) is arguably that the UN had
merely recognized the disappearance or extinction of the SFRY/FRY and
concluded, logically enough, that an extinct state could not be a state member of
the UN. There are several problems with this approach, however.
First, the UN did not purport to act on this basis. While the Security
Council resolution referred in its preamble to the SFRY's extinction, that
language was deleted in the subsequent General Assembly resolution. Among
other nations, Russia and China did not accept the extinction determination and
held the Permanent Member power of potential veto. On the other hand, the
United States, Germany, Austria and the five ex-SFRY secessionists
unsuccessfully urged the extinction position. The anti-extinction advocates
prevailed in excising the Security Council recitation.
Second, while it is true the UN has come to represent the collectivity of the
world's nation-states, that representation is indeed exclusive as to its own
membership but is not exclusive as to the existence of statehood. Membership in
the UN means statehood by Charter definition, but non-membership does not
mean non-statehood. Under customary international law, States have not
delegated to the UN the decision as to statehood. A decision by the UN
regarding statehood deserves serious weight, but is not the sole criterion. The
nations of the world make that decision, and they do it severally.
147
146. See supra nn. 117-18 and accompanying text.
147. JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 166 (1987); COLIN WARBRICK,
States and Recognition in International Law, INTERNATIONAL LAW 217, 218 (Malcolm D. Evans
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Furthermore, the UN did not even purport to act on an extinction basis, as that
phrase was deleted from the text of the Security Council resolution before
adoption by the General Assembly. In contrast, the wording of the Badinter
Commission was precise and definitive, but acted only for the European
Union. 148 The Commission's decision was rendered for its constituents and is
only "subsidiary" evidence of international law under Art. 38(l)(d) of the
Court's Statute. 149  At best, it would be evidence of only special regional
custom.
Third, there is a presumption of continuity in state existence, for good
reason. Stability in international relations requires it. 150 Not free from legal
difficulties is an inadequate rebuttal.
In 1993, both Bosnia and the FRY faced a jurisdictional dilemma. It was to
the procedural advantage of each to allege facts that favored the opposing party's
political claims, but that strategy also undermined their own claims. Bosnia had
taken the position the FRY was a new state, but this was at least one obstacle to
genocide jurisdiction. The FRY, for its part, had proclaimed its continuator
status, but this was an obstacle to a jurisdictional defense. The result was
ambiguity in the pleadings and an invitation to the Court to seek a way out,
which of course it did by "rising above" the dilemma and resorting to a
completely different basis of access jurisdiction, Article 35(2).
The Court's failure to properly address the dilemma can be ascribed only to
excessive deference to the awkward posture of the UN's political branches. It
would not have constituted a questionable review and legal challenge to the UN
political organs to find that the FRY was still a member of the UN. On the
contrary, it would have coincided with the legal opinion of the Under-Secretary
for Legal Affairs, and it would have coincided with actual UN practice during
the period 1993-2000. Since it involved access, rather than consent, it was a
matter the Court could have decided ex officio without regard to the pleading
convenience of the parties.
ed., Oxford University Press 2006) (stating that process of collective recognition in international
law does not exist).
148. BUTHLER, supra note 45, at 182; TERRETT, supra note 51, at 120-27; WARBRICK, supra note
147 at 264-68 (describing more stringent requirements for recognition by Western European
countries); Roland Bieber, European Community Recognition of Eastern European States: A New
Perspective for International Law?, 86 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 374, 374-75 (1992) (explaining
that the policy developed by Western European states since December 1991 should not provide
precedent for other parts of the world).
149. ICJ Statute, supra note 59, art. 38(i)(d); HAGUE ACADEMY SUCCESSION, supra note 25, at
308.
150. CRAWFORD, supra note 41, at 701; KRYSTYNA MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF
STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 548 (1954).
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The second time tranche, 2000 to 2007, presents a different set of
considerations. If the Court had ruled as it should have in 1993 and 1996, there
would have been no issues of inconsistency in 2007. If it had not done so earlier
in 2004 and 2007, it still could have resolved the apparent inconsistency by
regarding the 2000 UN "admission" as simply a confirmation of continued
membership to that date, with successor membership status thereafter. 15 1  It
could have left untouched its 2003 Judgment on Revision, with its negative
inference dictum on non-retroactivity of the FRY's admission in 2000, because
the narrow issue there was not UN membership, but the qualification of the 2000
"admission" as an "unknown fact" existing in 1996. The Court properly
rejected a retrospective inference of non-membership in the Revision case, given
the wording of Article 61 on revision, but the rejection of nunc pro tunc in 2004
was a case of petitio principii - it assumed what it set out to prove. The 2000
"admission" does not necessarily import a change in status. It is equally
consistent with political clarification, leaving the legal reality untouched.
Both putative solutions to the squaring-the-circle conundrum, resort to
Article 35(1) initially or, in default of that, retroactive sanitizing following
"admission," imply a certain disregard for the political maneuverings of the
UN's political branches. But would this have constituted the kind of judicial
review advocated by those who entertain the possibility and desirability in
appropriate cases of the Court's reversing the UN political branches on grounds
of unconstitutionality, in effect, for inconsistency with international law? 153 In
this particular case, the answer has to be "no" since the existence of legal
conflict is, at best, illusory.
A genuine issue of judicial review did arise, but was not finally resolved, in
the Lockerbie/Libya case. 154  The Security Council ordered Libya (under
151. This in fact was the position of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh in the dissent of the
Genocide Judgment 2007, 2007 I.C.J. Gen. List 91 (Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-
Khasawne) at para. 10; supra note 2, para. 10, at 4 (h); The UN-created International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia reached the same conclusion in 2003. Prosecutor v. Milan
Milutinovi, Case IT-99-37-PT, (May 6, 2003), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/Supplement/supp41-e/milutinovic.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
152. Genocide Revision Judgment 2003, supra note 13, paras. 67-73.
153. See generally Thomas M. Franck, The "Powers of Appreciation": Who Is the Ultimate
Guardian of UN Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519, 522-23 (1992); Michael J. Glennon, Protecting
the Court's Institutional Interests: Why Not the Marbury Approach?, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 121, 123-
24 (1987); but see Perez, supra note 19, at 443-44 (asserting that the institutional survival of the
ICJ may ultimately depend upon its willingness to exercise restraint on occasion).
154. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Provisional
Measures Order of Apr. 14, 1992) [hereinafter Lockerbie Order of Apr. 14], available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/89/7213.pdf; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the
1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
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Chapter VII of the Charter) to surrender for trial in the U.S. or the U.K., the two
Libyan nationals charged with planting the bomb that that destroyed Pan Am
Flight 103, even though Article 7 of the 1971 Montreal Convention on air
terrorism allowed Libya to extradite the suspects or prosecute them under
Libyan law. 155 The Security Council imposed sanctions for Libya's refusal to
extradite, whereupon, Libya sought to enjoin the sanctions as a violation of the
Montreal Convention. The Court postponed a definitive ruling on the merits
phase, which never arrived because Libya eventually agreed to a trial in the
Netherlands by a Scottish judge. 156 Implicit in the Court's decision to defer
resolution of the merits phase - and barely disguised in the opinions of several
judges, both dissenting and concurring - was the notion that the Court could
impose limitations on Security Council actions under Chapter VII of the
Charter. 157
The Genocide case was different, however. It did not involve action
pursuant to specific Charter authorization. It had not ripened into a potential
conflict with an otherwise applicable norm. The Genocide case falls into a
twilight zone where the Court should be free to calibrate its role as both an organ
of the UN and a neutral dispenser of international law under Article 38 of the
Statute. 158  The approach to the jurisdictional conundrum envisioned in this
article could not reasonably be considered an improper encroachment on UN
objectives. In fact, it would have enhanced the roles of both the UN in general,
and the Court in particular, by advancing the cause of peace through law. The
Court has an opportunity to do just that in the pending, and still languishing in its
initial stages, genocide case brought by Croatia against the FRY in 1999.159
XII. CONCLUSION
To conclude in summary fashion, the Court should have proceeded this
way:
v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 9 (Preliminary Objections Judgment of Feb. 27, 1998) [hereinafter Lockerbie
Judgment of Feb. 27], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/89/7249.pdf.
155. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept.
23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 178, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv3.pdf.
156. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 31, at 370-71, 419-20, 900-01, 1129-30; Bemd Martenczuk,
The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from
Lockerbie?, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 517, 517-18 (1999).
157. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 244 (1995); Jos6
E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 28-31, 39 (1996); Martenczuk,
supra note 156, at 527-28, 546.
158. ICJ Statute, supra note 59, art. 38(1) (providing that the Court's "function is to decide in
accordance with international law").
159. See Croatian Genocide Application 1999, supra note 113.
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(1) In the Genocide Orders of 1993 and 1996, relied explicitly on Article
35(1) of the Statute and not 35(2) (except as to the consent component in the
latter).
(2) In the NATO Order of 1999, ruled, as it did, that ratione materiae was
not primafacie present.
(3) In the Genocide Review Judgment of 2003, ruled, as it did, that the
2000 FRY admission to UN membership was not a qualifying unknown fact, and
denied admissibility to the application.
(4) In the NATO Judgment of 2004, adhered to the holding and ratione
decidendi of the NATO Order of 1999, i.e., no jurisdiction ratione materiae.
The opinion of the seven concurring "minority" Judges was not only consistent
with past rulings but right on the legal substance.
(5) In the Genocide Judgment of 2007, affirmed that the FRY had always
been a UN member regardless of the FRY's 2000 "admission", either as a
continuator or as an immediate successor, and affirmed its prior ruling on
existence of jurisdiction.
Throughout, a strictly "legal" approach would have been more direct,
sounder juridically, more consistent, and every bit as practical politically.
Inordinate sensitivity to the uncertainties of the UN's political branches was not
required in reaching the same procedural results. The strained resort to res
judicata was an unnecessary embarrassment.
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APPENDIX A
The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25
September 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions, Considering that the
state formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased
to exist, Recalling in particular resolution 757 (1992) which notes that the claim
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue
automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally accepted,
1. Considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations; and therefore
recommends to the General Assembly that it decide that the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United
Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly;
2. Decides to consider the matter again before the end of the main part of
the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly.
APPENDIX B
The General Assembly, having received the recommendation of the
Security Council of 19 September 1992 that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations
and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly,
1. Considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations; and therefore
decides that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should
apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in
the work of the General Assembly;
2. Takes note of the intention of the Security Council to consider the matter
again before the end of the main part of the forty-seventh session of the General
Assembly.
APPENDIX C
While the General Assembly has stated unequivocally that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot automatically continue
the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the
United Nations and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations, the only
practical consequence that the resolution draws is that the Federal Republic of
[Vol. 15:1
YUGOSLAV GENOCIDE CASE
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not participate in the work of the
General Assembly. It is clear, therefore, that representatives of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) can no longer participate in the
work of the General Assembly, its subsidiary organs, nor conferences and
meetings convened by it.
On the other hand, the resolution neither terminates nor suspends
Yugoslavia's membership in the Organization. Consequently, the seat and
nameplate remain as before, but in Assembly bodies representatives of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot sit behind the
sign Yugoslavia. Yugoslav missions at United Nations Headquarters and offices
may continue to function and may receive and circulate documents. At
Headquarters, the Secretariat will continue to fly the flag of the old Yugoslavia
as it is the last flag of Yugoslavia used by the Secretariat. The resolution does
not take away the right of Yugoslavia to participate in the work of organs other
than Assembly bodies. The admission to the United Nations of a new
Yugoslavia under Article 4 of the Charter will terminate the situation created by
resolution 47/1. (United Nations doc. A/47/485; emphasis in the original.)
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